Summary & Conclusions -This paper reviews the progress in software reliability over the past 15 years and discusses the best tools and practices that can be applied today. Software is seen to play an increasingly vital role over time, vis-avis hardware, in terms of system content. The software content is increasing and, often today, it is a key factor in safety critical applications in medicine, transportation, and nuclear energy. Significant software content is found in almost every system, appliance, and machine which we use. In addition, software is the backbone of our business enterprise operations.
INTRODUCTION

Background
In 1984, Professor Martin Shooman wrote a benchmark article on the History of Software Reliability [23] . Our paper updates the developments in software reliability that have occurred since then. Koss notes that "software reliability has been so overlooked.. .
As late as 1986-7 (some) major command and control systems had not made one assessment of software reliability" [l4] . He pointed out that the software in modern warplanes exceeds a million lines of code. He further states that "the ability to deliver reliable computer hardware can be considered to be a given. It is the ability to deliver the software of the system which will determine the extent to which the total system meets its operational availability." All too often, software reliability continues to be neglected.
Even today, too few organizations even measure software reliability and some of those who do only measure it from a historical perspective. To be proactive, software reliability should be managed throughout the development process, starting from the requirements definition phase. This paper addresses some worthwhile initiatives to better manage and measure software reliability.
Software reliability is the dominant driver of today's system reliability. Software driven outages have been reported to exceed hardware outages by an order of magnitude [ 131. Murphy points out that the main driver of field problems on over 2,000 European deployed Digital Equipment Corporation Systems fall into the class of System Management failures [20] . These problems are due to requirements and interface deficiencies. The present authors recognize these problem causes as a subset of software faults.
It should be noted that some noted reliability practitioners still question whether software can indeed fail. They argue that nothing actually "breaks" since its physical state remains unchanged-thus, "no broken" code exists. What fails is the software's ability to perform its intended or desired function, forcing the customer-the final arbitrator-to declare failure.
Software is proliferating in our every day products. Software is also embedded in machine logic in the form of "firmware". Firmware is software that resides in a nonvolatile medium that is read-only in nature and is write-protected when functioning in its operational environment. It cannot be modified during program execution. Many common products have significant firmware content. Automobiles, telephone routers, and some appliances incorporate up to 1,000,000 bytes of stored firmware. Firmware promotes personalization of the equipment's functionality so it can be customized to fit different application needs. This firmware capability also provides control and diagnostic information. This design flexibility and extra functionality can lead to reliability and safety problems.
Notable Reliability and Safety Problems
Unfortunately, software is not built with the same degree of provable components found in hardware. It is also not tested as exhaustively as hardware and thus tends to have more residual design problems. Commercial software products typically are shipped with one or more defects per KSLOC. One defect per KSLOC would be considered a relatively good latent defect level. This means that a 1,000 KSLOC of code, contains 1, OOO latent defects at shipment. These defects will be left to the customer to potentially experience before they are removed. To some hardware designers, this defect level would seem excessively high to their standards.
Software has caused some high profile reliability and safety problems. Neumann produced an excellent synopsis of many of these problems [2 11. The Neumann web page also publicizes current software and system problems.
For example, the Therac 25 therapy accelerator irradiates tumors in two modes:
electron beam bombardment and X-ray mode. The first therapy mode is low energy bombardment. The second mode Intersperses a Tungsten target into the electron beam before raising the beam energy one hundred fold. This puts the Therac 25 into the X-ray therapy mode. When "malfunction 54" appeared on the operator's screen, the system's operating modes became scrambled--exposing the patients with a lethal level of electron beam radiation. "Malfunction 54" has killed two people and harmed several more [9]. . Most of these early studies were focused on applying reliability growth models to failures data collected during the testing or field operation of software products. By the late 1980's, between 50 and 100 models surfaced for software reliability. A good summary of the history of these earlier developments is provided in
[6]. The number of these models reflected an active and healthy period of research.
Although sufficient models existed to analyze the reliability of software, no guidelines and practices were available to help practitioners apply them to their products.
Moreover, the shear number of models only added to their confusion. 
SRE Institutionalized
In 1992, AT&T Bell Laboratories adopted a best current practice for doing SRE.
(A condensed version can be found in [3] ). This practice defined 25 activities that should be included in a good SRE program. (See Table 1 .) As Table 1 shows, the practice how costly these failures would be to the user in the work that they do. The likelihood of failures in a software product depends heavily on how the user employs the product.
During the early stages of product development, this usage is captured in something called a functional profile. The functional profile describes high level functions performed by the user and how often these functions are performed. Trade-offs need to be made in establishing overall product requirements. Although adding more features into a software product will make it more desirable to a user, it will also add to the development costs--especially to those costs related to managing product reliability, From a reliability standpoint, the outcome of the Feasibility and Requirements phase is a set of reliability requirements. Properly defining system and software requirements is most important since requirement deficiencies are typically the number one cause of problems with field maintenance [12]. These requirements must not only specify objectives by failure class, but also the conditions under which the objectives are to be met. Understanding them is an evolutionary process that works best when they are the collaborative effort of both the developer and the customer.
Activities during the Design and Implementation phase are focused on developing a product that meets reliability objectives. The first activity is to allocate overall reliability among the components of the product. A number of steps can be taken to engineer the product so it meets its reliability objectives. A number of these are a carryover from hardware and system reliability methods. They include techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA) and failure mode and effects analysis (MEA). Since software failures are caused by residual faults in their design and development process, reliability methods must target processes that introduce faults and allow them to propagate to later development phases.
In addition, today's software products may include new or reused components developed (by other organizations). The reliability of this acquired software must also be managed.
Activities during the System Test and Field Trial phase are targeted at validating the developed software so it meets its reliability objectives. In product testing, we must mimic how the customer will use the software if we want an accurate view of the product's reliability.
The functional profile developed during the Feasibility and Requirements phase provides a start in specifying how the user will use the product. With the product designed and developed, we redefine the functional profile in terms of operations offered by the system to perform specific functions. For example, in an Automated Teller Machine (ATM) product, a function would be for a user to deposit money while the operations would be the ATM screens the user would need to do the deposit. The result would be an operational profile. Again, the operational profile will be used in developing test cases and in specifying the frequency and order in which they will be run. Failure data is collected during testing and is used to calibrate a reliability growth model. The calibrated model is used in turn to tell us the current level of reliability of the software product and can even be used (with adequate collected data) to estimate the remaining testing time needed to reach a reliability objective. Reliability growth is experienced during testing because once a failure is encountered, the underlying fault that triggered the failure is removed and thus will never cause another like failure.
The management of reliability does not stop when the product is delivered to the user, it continues during the Post Delivery and Maintenance phase. One activity focuses on estimating the amount of staff needed to provide hot-line support to help users with field-reported failures and staff needed to fix the software product. Field reliability of the software product should still be tracked to ensure the user is satisfied with product reliability. As fixes are introduced into the fielded software product, reliability will continue to grow. We should time the release of new software with major feature enhancements at points where the reliability level perceived by the user continues to be acceptable. Finally, we will use the information we gathered during this phase to improve our development processes that impact reliability and to improve the reliability of subsequent releases of the software product or new products.
RELIABLlTY MODELING
Modeling Background
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Another important step in making SRE techniques more accessible to practitioners was the development of tools. Although a large number of software reliability models have been published since the first models were published in 197 1, it is only since the mid-1980s that tools implementing these models have become widely available. Prior to their advent, development organizations wishing to use software reliability modeling techniques to monitor and control their development efforts had little choice but to develop their own tools. Because of the computational complexity of the models, the development of a software reliability modeling tool is a significant effort in its own right--and one to which many organizations were not willing to devote resources that could be applied to producing commercial systems. The advent of widely available tools could then be considered as important as increasing interest in the use of software reliability measurement.
One of the first software reliability measurement tools was developed by AT&T in 1977. Although originally intended for in-house use, it has been commercially available for the past ten years. The tool implements two models: the Musa Basic and
MusdOkumoto logarithmic Poisson models. The tool outputs can easily be related back to the development process. Rather than simply providing estimates of the model parameters, the tool provides estimates of initial current failure intensities as well as confidence intervals around these estimates. In addition, it predicts the amount of time required achieving user-specified failure intensity as well as the number of additional failures that will be seen before the specified failure intensity is achieved. This tool takes both time-domain and interval-domain failure data as input. Outputs are shown in both tabular and graphical fashion. Besides the outputs mentioned above, other plots are available which allow users to see how well the mode1 results fit the data, to see trends in the initial and current failure rates, and to see predictions of a development effort's completion date.
SMEWS Tool
One of the next major achievements was the development of SMEWS (Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliability Functions for Software) at the Naval Surface EverettIKeeneNikora (09/30/98 2:04 PM)
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Warfare Center in Dahlgren, VA. First released in 1983, this was the first tool to implement a wide variety of software reliability models. It included interval-domain (e.g., Schneidewind, Yamada S-Shaped, Brooks and Motley) as well as time-domain (Musa Basic, MusdOkumoto, Littlewood-Verrall) models. This last can be of particular interest to development organizations, since failure history data tends to be more widely available as the number of failures observed per test interval of a given length rather than as interfailure times. SMEWS was designed for ease-of-use. It has a menu-driven interface, which partitions the functionality into well-defined areas. These areas are data entry, editing, and transformation; model application; and determination of model applicability. Users can specify whether model parameters should be made using maximum-likelihood estimation or least squares. Model results are displayed in an easy to read tabular form and always include estimates of the model parameters. In addition, each model has its own specific set of results. They include the following: expected time to next failure, estimated total number of failures, estimate of the reliability for a specified time, number of failures remaining in the system, and the expected number of failures in a session of a specified duration. The sole model evaluation criterion for the earlier versions was goodness-of-fit (Chi-square test for interval-domain data and 2-tail Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for time-domain data). However, the current version also includes prequential likelihood, model bias, bias trend, and noise [2] . SMEWS was also designed to allow users to extend its capabilities. Unlike other software reliability modeling tools, SMEWS is distributed with the source code, which is a subset of ANSI FORTRAN '77, as well as design documentation. This allows users to customize the user interface to meet their own needs, as well as add models of their own.
Other Tools
In 1988 How much more likely it is that one model will produce more accurate predictions than another model. To compare two models, A and B, we first compute the prequential likelihood functions for each model, PLA and PLB. The ratio PLA / PLB specifies how much more likely it is that model A will produce accurate estimates than model B, given that there is no preference for either model prior to applying them.
The tendency for the model to produce biased results. For instance, a model may consistently predict interfailure times shorter than those actually observed. The technique for determining whether a model is biased is known as a u-plot.
The tendency for the model bias to shift with time. It may be that in the early stages of a testing effort, a model will be optimistically biased (predicting interfailure times that are shorter than those actually observed). During later stages of testing, the model may assume a pessimistic bias (predicting longer interfailure times than those actually observed). The technique for determining whether a model exhibits temporal shifts in its bias is known as a y-plot.
SRMP computes the prequential likelihood, u-plot, and y-plot for each of the nine models it implements, allowing users to determine the most appropriate model for their development effort. Unlike SMEWS, SRMP does not include traditional goodness-of-fit criteria such as the Chi-square or Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, and implements only timedomain models.
A distinguishing feature of the SoRel tool that was developed by LAAS, a laboratory of the National Center for Scientific Research in Toulouse, France, is a set of tests that can be applied to a set of failure data prior to model application to identify trends in the failure data. As a software system undergoes test, there may very well be times when the system is not experiencing reliability growth. For instance, the testing staff may be producing tests with the specific intention of revealing faults. Or, as new Page 13 functionality is added to the system, the testing team will focus on the new functionality, rather than sampling the operational profile. In either one of these cases, the failure data may appear to exhibit no improvement in reliability or an actual reliability decrease. 
CASRE Tool
In 1992, Computer Aided Software Reliability Estimation (CASRE) was developed in response to a perception that many of the available software reliability tools were not easy for non-specialists to use. The developers of CASRE wanted to provide a system, suitable for use by both research and practitioners with the following characteristics:
Allow users to select from a wide variety of time-domain and interval-domain models.
0
Display model results as high-resolution plots and in tabular form.
Guide users through the selection, execution, and evaluation of models through an appropriate set of structured menus.
Minimize the amount of time required for users to learn how the tool, and minimize the amount of time required to re-learn the tool after having not used it for an extended interval.
Finally, one feature of CASRE drew on research indicating that one way of increasing the predictive accuracy of software reliability models was to form weighted sums of the 
LAST THOUGHTS
Sometimes criticisms are heard that too many models of software reliability are a sign that no one knows what is going on. The plethora of models can optimistically be seen as evidence of the energy and excitement in the field. Obviously, extensive ongoing research and vitality exist. It is also worth citing again the recent Handbook on Software Reliability. This is a very complete reference and would be a fundamental library addition to anyone interested in exploring this field. The text also contains a CD that has the reliability tools mentioned in this article.
